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The concept of convergence is extended to non-income components of human 
development index and the index itself. Evidence of weak absolute convergence is found 
over 1975-2001. The results are robust and verified by various conditional β-convergence 
models and also supported by the evidence of weak σ-convergence. Population weighted 
analyses provide support for polarisation amongst developing countries but a slight 
reduction in world inequality. The dynamics of regional analysis reveals a movement of 
sub-Saharan Africa towards the low band of human development with Asia and Latin 
America making progress. High immobility of the early part of the period is followed by 
considerable upward and downward mobility in the latter part indicating a possible case 
of the “twin peaks” type of polarisation. 
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International Convergence and Inequality of Human Development: 1975-2001 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper is about the dynamics of inequality in human development between countries. 
The issues of inequality along with poverty are firmly back on the agenda of most 
international development agencies. The Millennium Development Goals and targets 
were set at the turn of the century against a background of decades of failure in human 
development in order to reverse the declining trends. After a few years the hopes for 
reversing the trends, at least in a large number of sub-Saharan African countries, are 
receding significantly (Sahn and Stifel 2003). Lack of achieving a basic threshold for 
education and health has been regarded as a structural impediment, amongst others, to 
sustained economic growth and human welfare in poorer countries. Despite this the levels 
of health, education and economic growth are declining in a number of these countries 
mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. During the decade of 1990s some 54 countries became 
poorer, 34 countries experienced a drop in life expectancy and the incidence of under 
five-mortality rate increased in 14 countries (UNDP 2003). In the table of healthy life 
expectancy the bottom 10 countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, have a healthy life 
expectancy of below to just above 30 years, half of that of the top 10 countries (WHO 
2002). The most recent WHO report indicates that the increasing child mortality and 
decreasing life expectancy in a number of poorer countries in recent years has widened 
the global gap between the poor countries and the rest of the world. It seems that the large 
gap in life expectancy between developed and developing countries of 50 years ago has 
been replaced in recent years by a large gap between a group of very poor countries, 
mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of the world (WHO 2003). 
 
In contrast progress in health, education and economic growth in a number of countries, 
mainly from South East Asia and Latin America, has been impressive. In between were 
countries which made little progress, mainly from Asia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (UNDP 2003). In brief the experience of developing countries have 
been mixed at best. The growth rates in particular have been a mixture of takeoffs,   4
stagnation and decline. Between 1960 to 1990 less developed countries had wide 
variability in their growth rate ranging from –2.7 to +6.9 per cent (Pritchett 1997). This 
begs the question of whether the world is becoming more polarised. 
 
The research on income differences amongst countries in recent years has taken two 
closely related approaches: testing the hypothesis of convergence and measuring 
inequality and its dynamics. These are basically two sides of the same coin, both 
investigating whether the distribution between richer and poorer countries is moving 
towards equalisation or more polarisation. 
 
Some studies argue that in the long run the per capita income of countries would 
converge and the inequality would be reduced.
1 More recent research has focused on 
world income inequality for a number of reasons including the important links between 
inequality, growth, political economy and conflict. Progress in international trade and 
globalisation has also focused the attention on international inequality. Globalisation has 
been linked to having an effect on inequality within countries and amongst countries 
though there is little agreement on whether such effects have been positive or negative
2. 
In general the outcome of research on world income (expenditure) inequality is 
controversial apparently due to the adaptation of different methodology by researchers 
(UNDP 2003). 
 
A number of studies conclude that the world distribution of income has worsened over 
the past three or four decades. Korzeniewicz and Moran (1997) conclude that the gap 
between richer and poorer nations has grown steadily between 1965 and 1990 and in 
particular intensified during the recession years of 1980s. The UNDP (1999) indicates 
that the ratio of income in the richer countries with 20% of world population to the 
poorest nations with 20% of world population had risen from 30 times in1960 to 74 times 
                                                 
1 See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 and a number of other studies referred to in next section on 
convergence. 
2 See for example Dollar and Kraay 2002a and 2002b and Milanovic 2003.   5
in 1977. Over a longer period the ratio of per capita income of the richest country to the 
poorest between 1870 and 1990 increased by almost a factor of five (Pritchett 1997). 
 
Other studies focus on between countries inequality as well as within country inequalities 
by also taking into account income distribution within countries. In some cases this is 
done by estimating the entire distribution of income from the Gini coefficient for the 
country (Chotikapanich et al.1997 and Schultz 1998). More recently Sala-i-Martin (2002) 
concludes that between 1980 and 1998 the world income inequality shows a decline. 
Dollar and Kraay (2002a and 2002b) argue that global inequality increased significantly 
over the past two centuries stabilising in 1980 and somewhat declining in more recent 
years. Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) study the distribution of income amongst the 
world citizens by looking at the distribution amongst 11 quantiles for each country in the 
sample. The time span of this study is spread over two centuries concluding that in the 
early 19
th century the main contributor to inequality was the differences within countries 
while in more recent years the main source was the inequality between countries. 
Milanovic (2002) uses country household surveys for deriving the income and  
expenditure distribution within countries and concludes that the world income inequality 
increased from 1988 to 1993 from a very high base. The Gini coefficient of 63 in 1988 
increased at a rather fast annual rate of 0.6  to 66 in 1993.  
 
In brief there is little agreement on where the world inequality is heading for in the future. 
However, the above studies, though controversial in their results, have two common 
features. First they agree that most of the world inequality is driven by between country 
inequality while the within country inequality is a low contributor to the overall 
inequality. Second that they all concentrate on the inequality or convergence of income or 
expenditure and use no other indicator of welfare.
3  
 
                                                 
3 The only partial exception to the second point is Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) which also considers 
the inequality in life expectancy as a wider measure of welfare, however, this measure in their study is only 
employed for obtaining income over the expected life of population and not as a measure of welfare in its 
own right.   6
To the best of our knowledge there is no study which extends the concept of convergence 
to non-income indicators. Given the spread of mass communications devices in recent 
decades it seems equally likely, if not more, that convergence amongst countries could 
happen with respect to the level of education and health as compared to income. This 
paper attempts to fill up this gap by studying international convergence of, and inequality 
in, human development 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly discusses the approaches 
to the concept of convergence. Section III relates and tests the relevance of this concept 
to HDI and its none-income components. Section IV testes the hypothesis of convergence 
for HDI. Section V takes into account the population concentration in deriving the 
measures of inequality, discusses the dynamics of change in distribution of human 
development and the extent of upward and downward mobility. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Convergence 
According to the neoclassical growth model, given the fully competitive markets and the 
availability of similar technology, for the same rate of investment every economy would 
grow at a similar rate determined by the exogenous technical progress and population 
growth. Assuming a production function with constant returns to scale and the 
diminishing returns of capital, economies with lower levels of initial productivity enjoy a 
higher rate of growth in productivity and as such will catch up with the more developed 
economies. The more recent work on explaining the process of catching up is extensive 
and advocates three possible, and sometimes related, forms of convergence: β-
convergence, conditional β-convergence and σ-convergence.  
 
β-convergence postulates that poorer countries will tend to grow faster than the richer 
countries. This is because of the diminishing marginal returns to capital in the richer 
countries, as the level of capital per labour is relatively high in these countries. Moreover, 
the further down a country is below its balanced growth path and the higher the lags in 
access to new technology the higher would be the expected growth when the country   7
gains access to such technology (Romer 1986). In the empirical literature, running a 
cross-section regression of the time-averaged per capita income growth rate on the level 
of per capita income in the initial period tests this. A negative sign for the respective 
coefficient reflects the existence of convergence.  
 
Most of the relevant empirical literatures have attempted to test cross-country β-
convergence and measure the speed of convergence (see for example Baumol 1986, 
Romer 1986, Baumol and Wolff 1988, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995, Sala-i-Martin 1996 and de la Fuente 1997). The general consensus is that 
there exists an evidence of convergence only amongst the richer countries. There is little 
evidence of convergence on the part of low-income countries (Zind 1991). Some 
researchers go further by stating that, while the growth rates of income amongst richer 
countries show a historical convergence, the picture for less developed countries vis-à-vis 
the richer countries tells a story of divergence (Pritchett 1997). Such results provide 
support for the idea of convergence clubs in the sense that convergence may apply to 
groups of countries which have similar initial conditions and structures. One such club 
may be the richer countries and another could be developing countries or the least 
developed countries. Indeed the inequality amongst such clubs may persist and may even 
result in further divergence (Martin and Sunley 1998, Quah 1993 and 1996b).  The 
literature considers a number of possible reasons for the lack of convergence amongst 
poor and rich countries. One such reason is mainly related to the proposition that the 
nature and process of convergence requires that the institutions in the poorer countries to 
be supportive of inward flows of foreign capital and technology. Another explanation is 
based on the fact that human capital is initially higher in the richer countries resulting in a 
higher output and hence higher saving and investment in these countries enabling them to 
maintain their lead over poorer countries indefinitely
4 (Romer 1986, 1990, Sachs and 
Larrain 1993 and Hossain 2000).  
 
                                                 
4 These have been incorporated in the new endogenous growth models, which consider the human capital  
and technology to be endogenous.    8
The second type of convergence, conditional β-convergence, mainly takes into 
consideration the steady-state growth path of the country.
5 If the structural conditions of 
countries were different the respective long-run growth rates would be different which 
may result in divergence or at best a very weak convergence. This type of convergence 
may be tested in the same way except that the regression should also include a set of 
explanatory variables which would define the steady-state growth path for per capita 
income (Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). A negative coefficient for the per 
capita income in the initial period, in the presence of the extra conditional variables, 
suggests the existence of conditional β-convergence. 
 
The third type, σ-convergence, envisages that the cross-country dispersion of per capita 
income levels across economies would tend to decrease over time implying a tendency 
amongst countries to equalization of per capita income in the long-run. That is, over time 
the dispersion around the steady-state value decreases (increases) if its initial value is 
above (below) the steady-state value. β-convergence is a necessary condition for σ-
convergence but not a sufficient condition (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). To put this 
differently, whether σ-convergence is because of the relatively higher growth rates of 
poorer countries or not can be studied by testing for the existence of β-convergence in its 
different forms (Hossain 2000). 
 
III. Convergence of Human Development Index 
The concept of convergence is mainly discussed in the literature in the context of output 
per capita usually measured in terms of GDP per capita. This concept was developed 
from the Solow model and one of its main arguments relates to the diminishing returns to 
capital. As the Human Development Index (HDI) also has none income components, it 
may be useful to explore the relevance of convergence to this index. For this purpose a 
brief description of HDI may be helpful. 
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The  HDI is a composite index of four indicators. Its  components are  to  reflect  three 
major dimensions  of  human  development: longevity, knowledge and access to 
resources. These are to represent  three of the essential choices in life (UNDP 1990) and 
are derived from the notion of human capabilities as proposed by Amartya Sen. Although 
this index has been criticised on a number of grounds
6, it has been suggested that the 
components of the HDI together seem to provide an almost acceptable package of 
indicators of the level of living at an aggregate level (Dasgupta et al.1992) and has been 
adopted frequently in recent literature.
7 
 
The dimension of longevity is directly measured by life expectancy at birth. Knowledge 
is presented by a measure of educational achievement based on a weighted sum of adult 
literacy rate and the combined first, second and third level gross enrolment ratio. Access 
to resources is represented by the logarithm of real per capita income (purchasing power 
parity). 
 
The concept of diminishing returns would apply to the income component of HDI. It 
would also apply to component of education, as the early “units” of educational 
attainments are relatively easier and less costly to attain. Diminishing returns are equally 
applicable to the component of life expectancy as it would be much more difficult and 
costly to attain a higher level of life expectancy from an initially high level than a low 
level. 
 
The main difference with income component is that while income in the context of 
diminishing returns to capital is linked to the mobility of capital, at international level for 
                                                                                                                                                   
5 Some literature regards conditional β-convergence as a form of β-convergence and classifies with the 
latter. However, the extent of empirical work on the former may warrant such typology (see Hossain 2000 
for example). 
6 For some of the criticisms see McGillivray 1991, Mc Gillivray and White 1993, Srinivasan 1994 and 
Noorbakhsh 1998. 
7 See for example Noorbakhsh 1999, Neumayer 2001 and Kosack 2003. 
   10
non-income components, this does not apply fully. However, the concept of diminishing 
returns may be linked to the point that the returns to investment in education and health 
diminish as the level of investment in health and education increases. Two indicators of 
adult literacy and combined enrolment ratios measure the dimension of education in HDI. 
The returns to investment in education, for improving adult literacy and increasing the 
combined enrolment ratio, will be higher in countries that are relatively at a lower level 
of initial education as measured by these indicators. Similarly the returns to investment in 
health, for improving life expectancy, will be higher in countries which have a lower life 
expectancy as compared to those with a higher level of life expectancy. In brief countries 
with lower level of education and health will grow faster over time, in terms of education 
and health, than countries which initially enjoy a higher level of education and health. 
 
More specifically in a country which has reached a very high level of primary and 
secondary enrolment, only the relatively more expensive investment in tertiary education 
could improve the level of educational attainment used in HDI. Similarly for an equal 
amount of investment in health facilities in two countries with similar conditions but with 
low and high levels of life expectancy, relatively more life expectancy could be gained in 
the country with the low initial level of life expectancy.  
 
The concept of steady state rate of growth would be equally, if not more, applicable to 
education and life expectancy. Given that literacy and enrolment ratios are both defined 
in the context of countries and the question of comparative quality is not addressed and 
also taking into account the upper limit of 100% for these indicators, it seems more 
plausible to suggest that the steady state growth rates of countries for these indicators are 
relatively more homogenous and closer than those for output and income in the 
neoclassical model of growth. Similar arguments may be developed for life expectancy 
indicator.  More importantly access to technology relevant to education and health for 
improving the level of adult literacy, combined enrolment and life expectancy in 
countries which are at a lower level of these indicators is relatively more plausible as   11
compared to access to technology required for obtaining a higher level of production in 
the standard neoclassical model.  
 
We tested these suggestions empirically by estimating the parameters of the following 
equation, which is mainly the growth regression equation for adult literacy and life 
expectancy. 
1
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+  is the annualised 
growth of the variable x in the i
th country over the period of t and t+T. A  negative value 
of β would be an evidence of β -convergence. Table 1 shows the results for the 
annualised adult literacy growth (1975-98) and life expectancy (1977-98) for a sample of 
93 developing countries. 
  

















2 0.88  0.08 
F Statistic  647.28
***  8.97
*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results in Table 1 provide support for the suggestion that the diminishing returns to 
investment in education and health are indeed the case in developing countries. The β  
coefficient for both indicators is negative and highly significant indicating that countries 
with a lower initial level of adult literacy (life expectancy) grow faster in terms of these 
indicators.  
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Briefly we may conclude that it is plausible to extend the concept of diminishing returns 
to investment to the non-income components of HDI. Consequently it can be expected 
that countries with a low level of human development in the initial period would have a 
higher rate of growth in HDI in the long-run than those with a high level human 
development in the initial period. 
 




( )log( ) log( )
k J
it T
















=  is the ratio of HDI in the i
th country to the average for the sample of 







+  is the annualised growth of the variable 
HDI in the i
th country over the period of t and t+T. A value of β in the range of  10 β −〈 〈  
would be an evidence of β -convergence. That is, the nearer the value of β  to –1, the 
higher the speed of convergence and the nearer to zero the lower the speed of 
convergence.
8 By implication zero means no convergence and a positive value for β  
indicates a divergence. Sij is the j
th structural condition variable and  ij λ  is the respective 
parameter to be estimated. There are K different models where the structural conditional 
variables change and for k=0 all Sij are zeros i.e. the absolute convergence model.  
  
The data for HDI for the period of 1975 to 2001 (at intervals of 5 years up to 1995 and 6 
years for the last period) has been taken from the UNDP 2003. As for some countries 
time series start at the middle of this period; adjustment in the length of the period in 
equation (2) are made to reflect this for the respective countries.  
 
The variables included for reflecting conditional convergence are selected on the grounds 
of contributing to the components of HDI. There are two types of variables which may   13
take account of the external and domestic contributions to HDI. In the conditional beta-
convergence model it is postulated that the institutions in poorer countries should be 
supportive of inward flows of foreign capital and technology. While a certain amount of 
technology is transferred with foreign direct investment, the openness of the country to 
international trade also may be responsible for such a transfer. We have selected both 
these variables: foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDI) and trade as a 
percentage of GDP (TRD). Foreign aid as a percentage of GDP (AID) has also been 
included as a substantial amount of aid is geared to improving the health and educational 
status of the recipient country. These variables reflect the external sources of contribution 
to HDI. 
 
We have selected three variables to reflect the domestic contributions to HDI: gross 
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (GDI), public sector expenditure on 
education and health as a percentage of GDP (PEEH) and the number of telephone lines 
per population (TEL) to reflect the level of infrastructure.
9 
 
Our initial sample of 93 countries includes 62 medium and 31 low human development 
countries. We have not included the high human development countries in the β-
convergence models on the grounds of the general consensus, in the literature of growth, 
on the possible existence of wide apart convergence clubs for rich and developing 
countries. In addition the variables selected to represent the structural conditions would 






                                                                                                                                                   
8 Chaterji (1992) and Chaterji and Dewhurst (1996) distinguish between weak convergence where β<0, and 
strong convergence where –2<β<0. 
9 The data for FDI, AID, GDI and TRD are the totals over 1973-98, for PEEH average annual for 1990-98 
and TEL for 1990. The source for all is the World Development Indicators STAR disk. 
10 For example AID or TEL would not be suitable variables the high human development group of 
countries.   14
IV. Empirical results for conversion hypotheses 
We tested the hypothesis of β-convergence, in its absolute and conditional forms, through 
a number of models for different samples. Table 2 shows the results for the sample of 
medium and low human development countries. 
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Log AID    -0.000 
(-1.04) 







  0.001 
(1.90)
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Log TRD    -0.002 
(-1.39) 





















































2 0.25  0.28  0.35  0.37  0.38  0.41  0.38 








*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Model 1 reflects the absolute convergence hypothesis. The negative sign of hdit is as 
expected and it is significant at the 1% level indicating a clear tendency to convergence 
amongst the countries in the sample. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is very 
low reflecting a very slow speed of convergence over the period. 
 
Model 2 introduces the conditional β-convergence. The conditions employed are mainly 
of external origin and at the same time containing some domestic substance. 
Theoretically, convergence is conditional on governments being supportive of foreign   15
capital transfer and technology. Often the literature argues that the transfer of technology 
and capital is through foreign direct investment, openness and sometimes aid. These 
variables are normally regarded as reflecting the degree of globalisation in a country. The 
first point to mention about model 2 is that in the presence of these global variables the 
coefficient of hdit has remained negative and significant with almost the same magnitude. 
The coefficients of AID and TRD are not significant and both have negative signs. 
However, the same for FDI is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
 
Model 3 introduces conditions which are more directly of domestic origin. The gross 
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP is relevant to the income component of 
HDI, while public sector expenditure on education and health as a percentage of GDP are 
directly relevant to the education and longevity components of HDI. The coefficient of 
hdit has remained negative and highly significant. GDI has a positive coefficient 
significant at the 5% level indicating that the growth differential in HDI is a positive 
function of investment which most probably works through the income component of the 
index. Public sector expenditure on education and health has a surprisingly negative sign 
and is significant at the 1% level. The break down of the sample into medium human 
development and low human development sub-samples may throw more light on the 
negative sign of PEEH, which we will discuss below. 
 
In model 4 we have also included the number of telephone lines per population as a proxy 
for infrastructure. The overall results remain similar to the previous model and the new 
variable TEL has a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. Once again the 
depiction of conditional convergence remains intact. 
 
Model 5 includes all variables of external and internal origin without TEL.
11 The 
coefficient of TRD has become significant and at the same time the coefficient of hdit has 
                                                 
11 We may be interested to have the results with and without TEL being included as this variable has been 
used in the literature to reflect conditions of internal and external origins alternately.   16
remained negative and highly significant. Model 6 includes TEL and there is little change 
to the overall picture except that the coefficient of TEL is also significant at the 5% level. 
 
In model 7 AID is excluded from the equation on the basis of a possible argument that aid 
may have been more provided to countries which have had a lower level of human 
development, hence the question of endogeniety may arise. The results do not change and 
the coefficient of hdit remains negative and highly significant.  
 
Overall the results are extremely robust indicating strongly that there has been a 
conditional convergence in HDI close to absolute convergence though in all cases the 
speed of convergence has been very slow.  
 
A fundamental idea behind the concept of absolute convergence is that the structural 
conditions in countries are similar. The literature of growth argues that there may be 
clubs of convergence where the members of such specific clubs have a tendency to 
converge. With this in mind we split the sample into medium human development and 
low human development countries to see if the results would be different. 
 
Table 3 provides the results for the same models for medium human development 
countries.    17
Table 3. β-convergence models of HDI for medium human development countries. 
Models/ 
Variables 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7 




































Log AID    -0.000 
(-0.08) 







  0.000 
(0.57)
 






Log TRD    -0.001 
(-1.07) 
















































    (0.73) 
Adjusted R
2 0.39  0.46  0.53  0.55  0.58  0.62  0.58 








*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
The most interesting feature is that the same picture for absolute and conditional 
convergence emerges, as the coefficient of hdit remains negative and highly significant in 
all models. The magnitude of this coefficient once again reveals a very slow speed of 
convergence. In this respect the results are very robust. The globalisation variables of 
AID, FDI and TRD are not significant in any of the models indicating that in this group 
of countries they played no role in the growth differential of HDI. The domestic 
investment variable, GDI, is only significant in the last three models at the 10% level. 
PEEH has interestingly remained negative and highly significant indicating that the level 
of public expenditure has been lower in countries which have enjoyed higher growth 
differentials in HDI. TEL is significant in models 4 and 6. Overall model 6 seems to 
provide sensible results with a rather high adjusted R
2 of 0.62.  
 
Table 4 shows the results for the same models of absolute and conditional  β-convergence 
for low human development countries. 
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Table 4. β-convergence models of HDI for low human development countries. 
Models/ 
Variables 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7 




































Log AID    -0.002 
(-1.74)
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(0.44)
 






Log TRD    -0.000 
(-0.12) 

















































2 0.44  0.48  0.36  0.46  0.43  0.45  0.39 








*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Once again the models are very robust as the coefficient of hdit remains negative and 
highly significant in all models. The magnitude of this coefficient is nearly twice as much 
as what we had for other samples but still indicating a slow speed of convergence. Most 
other variables reflecting the external and internal conditions are not significant. The 
exceptions are AID in models 2 and 5, but with negative signs and only significant at the 
10% level and also TEL in model 4. The other interesting point is that PEEH is not 
significant in any of the models. It seems that the medium human development countries 
mainly drive the significance of the parameter of this variable in the full sample. Overall 
the results are robust in all models for all samples indicating a weak convergence in HDI 
over time. 
 
The last type of convergence,σ -convergence, hypothesizes that the deviations from the 
long-run cross-country mean have a tendency to converge towards the mean over time 
(Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). The underlying assumption for this type of 
convergence is that the steady-state value of the variable concerned and its time trends   19
are the same for all countries as the constant term in equation (2) conceptually includes 
the steady-state value of the HDI variable (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). In the 
empirical literature the standard deviation of the logarithm of the variable concerned is 
commonly used for investigating if this type of convergence has taken place.  
 
Table 5 shows the results for three different measures of dispersion of HDI amongst 
countries over time. The first column presents the standard deviation of log (hdi). The 
second column depicts the results for the coefficient of variation (CV) which is the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean of distribution. The last column shows the gini 




Table 5. Measures of  σ -convergence for HDI 
Year SD



























All measures show a convergence amongst middle and low human development 
countries. However, considering the length of the period, the pace of convergence seems 
to be very slow confirming our previous results for β-convergence. 
 
V. Population-weighted measures of inequality and dynamics of mobility 
The measures considered so far were for investigating the possible occurrence of 
convergence as this particular strand of literature on inequality and convergence 
postulates. However, these measures assess the degree of concentration between 
                                                 
12 The GiniC coefficient has been computed without taking  the size of the population into account. It is a 
measure of the concentration (dispersion) of indicator HDI amongst countries regardless of their population 
size (see  Pyatt et al. 1980, Milanovic 1997 and Noorbakhsh 2003).  
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countries without taking into account the population of the countries concerned. 
Furthermore as convergence is basically about poor countries catching up with rich 
countries, it is argued that, it should be more relevant to the cross sectional of the 
distribution of the phenomena under consideration and not to the convergence of 
individual economies to their own individual steady state (Quah 1996a). This is to do 
with the dynamics of mobility in distribution. 
 
To start with we have employed two measures of inequality, which take into account the 
population share of each country, for investigating the extent and dynamics of inequality 
amongst countries. These measures are the gini coefficient (Gini) and the Theil index.
13 
As the concept of inequality is not constrained by the argument of clubs of convergence it 
would be interesting to measure both these measures for two separate samples: the 
medium and low human development sample (ML) and for all countries including  the 
high human development countries. Furthermore we limit our study to measuring 
between-country inequalities as most recent literature, which have used the decomposed 
measures for including the within country sources of inequality as well, conclude that the 
main source of inequality is the between-country component (see for example Schultz, 
1998, Milanovic 2002 and Bourguignon and Morrison 2002).
14 Table 6 shows the results 
for our two samples. 
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where for N countries  i y  is the value of HDI in country i,  () i f y  is the population share of country i in 











where  i Y  and   i X  are the HDI and population shares of country i respectively.   
 
 
14 Furthermore there is a controversy in the procedure used for finding the within country distribution and 
hence the within country inequality for income. In addition the extension of such procedures for deriving 
the within country distribution of the non-income components of HDI may be even more controversial. 
Lastly because education and health are more public goods in most developing countries it is more likely 
that their distributions within countries are, relatively speaking, more even than that of income.     21
 
Table 6. Population weighted measures of inequality. 








1975 0.1001  0.6962  0.1887  0.6708 
1980 0.1198  0.7355  0.1878  0.7059 
1985 0.1220  0.7285  0.1805  0.7008 
1990 0.1235  0.6827  0.1745  0.6594 
1995 0.1220  0.6781  0.1678  0.6616 
2001 0.1230  0.6666  0.1636  0.6576 
 
For the ML human development sample the Gini coefficient has increased from 1975 to 
1990 with a drop in 1995 before resuming its upward trend. This indeed is showing a 
picture of divergence amongst ML human development countries. Theil index for these 
countries shows an initial increase before coming down; its decline over the entire period 
is hardly considerable. This is in line with the results of weak convergence in the 
previous section. As for the full sample Gini shows a steady but relatively weak decline 
over 26 years while the Thiel index depicts an initial increase before coming down in 
2001 to just below its level in 1975. The overall picture for both samples does not show a 
considerable decrease in equality in human development amongst countries. 
 
Another way of looking at the international distribution of HDI is to focus on the degree 
of mobility of various regions in the world over time. Table 7 shows the regional 
composition of various quantiles of the international distribution of HDI for the period of 
our sample for all countries.   22
Table 7. Dynamics of regional composition of HDI for selected quantiles.  (Percents) 













1975 Total  33.0  18.0  3.0  21.0  1.0  24.0  100.0 
 Bottom  20%  85.0  15.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
 Middle 60%  26.7  25.0  3.3  35.0  1.7  8.3  100.0 
 Top 20%  0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  0.0  95.0  100.0 
                
1980 Total  30.1  18.6  2.7  20.4  6.2  22.1  100 
 Bottom  20%  82.6  17.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100 
 Middle 60%  22.4  25.4  3.0  32.8  10.4  6.0  100 
 Top 20%  0.0  0.0  4.3  4.3  0.0  91.3  100 
                
1985 Total  32.8  19.7  2.5  18.9  5.7  20.5  100 
 Bottom  20%  88.0  12.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100 
 Middle 60%  25.0  29.2  1.4  30.6  9.7  4.2  100 
 Top 20%  0.0  0.0  8.0  4.0  0.0  88.0  100 
                
1990  Total  28.7 22.8  2.2  16.2  11.8 18.4  100 
 Bottom  20%  77.8  22.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100 
 Middle 60%  22.0  30.5  1.2  25.6  19.5  1.2  100 
 Top 20%  0.0  0.0  7.4  3.7  0.0  88.9  100 
                
1995  Total  30.0 22.9  2.1  15.7  11.4 17.9  100 
 Bottom  20%  85.7  14.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100 
 Middle 60%  21.4  32.1  1.2  25.0  19.0  1.2  100 
 Top 20%  0.0  3.6  7.1  3.6  0.0  85.7  100 
                
2001  Total  30.0 22.9  2.1  15.7  11.4 17.9  100 
 Bottom  20%  92.9  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100 
 Middle 60%  19.0  34.5  1.2  25.0  19.0  1.2  100 
 Top 20%  0.0  3.6  7.1  3.6  0.0  85.7  100 
 
 
 For 1975 the first row of Table 7 shows the distribution of countries in various regions of 
the world. 85% of countries in the bottom 20% of HDI value were in Africa with Asia 
and Pacific accounting for 15%. The top 20% band is exclusive to European countries 
and their offshoots (95%) and Japan. Latin American countries dominate the middle 60% 
band with relatively lesser presence from other regions. There is very little change in the 
bottom 20% band in 1980 which is again dominated primarily by African and to a lesser 
extent by Asian countries. This is coupled with relatively little change in the middle band 
composition. As for the top band the dominance of Europe and its offshoots is not 
challenged but a relatively small presence of Latin American countries in this band is 
notable. 1985 shows a worsening of the position of African countries and an   23
improvement in the case of Asian countries in the bottom 20% band with little notable 
change in other bands. Fewer African and more Asian countries appear in the bottom 
20% band in 1990 before the worsening trend for Africa resumes to its path in 1995 and 
2001. For the last two periods the share of African (Asian) countries in the lower band 
has increased (decreased) notably. The entry of some Asian countries into the top 20% 
band is interesting. However, despite the presence of countries from all regions (except 
Africa) in the top band in 2001, the European countries and their offshoots dominate this 
band.   
  
The overall picture for the dynamics of human development over the period of  1975 to 
2001 reveals little upward mobility for the poor countries of the world. The relative 
situation for sub-Saharan African countries worsened, for some Asian countries improved 
with the top band being dominated by European countries and their offshoots.  
 
A complementary way of reviewing the dynamics of human development inequality is to 
find out how countries change position over time. This approach, adopted in recent 
literature investigates the degree of mobility of countries (with the size of their population 
taken into account) moving from one band of HDI to another over time.
15 Table 8 shows 
the results for four HDI bands relative to the mean of the sample and for various sub-
periods. 
                                                 
15 See Quah 1996a and Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002 for its application to income.   24
Table 8. Relative populated HDI mobility matrix and mobility ratios.               (Percents)    
                                                         
                                                                     HDI in initial year relative to mean  




1 to 4/3 
mean 









1975-1980          
More than 4/3 mean         99.6        0.0       0.0       0.0       19.9   
1 to  4/3 mean           0.4    100.0       0.0       0.0       17.7   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        0.0     99.6       5.5       53.8   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       0.4     94.5         8.6   
Total population share         20.0     17.7     53.4       8.9     100.0   
Immobility ratio                98.4 
Upward mobility                  1.4 
Downward mobility                  0.2 
          
1980-1985                       
More than 4/3 mean         76.9        0.0       0.0       0.0       14.5   
1 to  4/3 mean         23.1    100.0       0.0       0.0       22.7   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        0.0     98.3       0.0       53.1   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       1.7   100.0         9.7   
Total population share         18.9     18.3     54.0       8.8     100.0   
Immobility ratio                93.8 
Upward mobility                  0.0 
Downward mobility                  6.2 
           
1985-1990                       
More than 4/3 mean         95.0        0.0       0.0       0.0       11.3   
1 to  4/3 mean           5.0    100.0       2.2       0.0       26.0   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        0.0     97.8       0.0       52.4   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       0.0   100.0       10.3   
Total population share         11.9     24.2     53.6     10.3     100.0   
Immobility ratio               98.2 
Upward mobility                 0.5 
Downward mobility                 1.3 
           
1990-1995                       
More than 4/3 mean         85.4        7.1       0.0       0.0       11.0   
1 to  4/3 mean         14.6      92.8       2.8       0.0       26.8   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        0.1     96.6     26.3       53.9   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       0.6     73.7         8.3   
Total population share         10.8     25.6     52.8     10.8     100.0   
Immobility ratio                87.1 
Upward mobility                  9.1 
Downward mobility                  3.8 
           
1995-2001                       
More than 4/3 mean        100.0        8.0       0.0       0.0       12.8   
1 to  4/3 mean           0.0      88.7     44.4       0.0       47.5   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        3.3     55.6     32.5       33.8   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       0.0     67.5         5.9   
Total population share         10.7      26.4     54.2       8.7     100.0   
Immobility ratio                78.0 
Upward mobility                21.2 
Downward mobility                  0.8 
           
1975-2001                       
More than 4/3 mean         67.5        0.0       0.0       0.0       13.5   
1 to  4/3 mean         32.5      96.1     52.6       0.0       51.6   
2/3 to 1 mean           0.0        3.9     45.7     54.4       29.9   
Less than 2/3 mean           0.0        0.0       1.7     45.6         5.0   
Total population share         20.0      17.7     53.4       8.9     100.0   
Immobility ratio                63.7 
Upward mobility                26.8 
Downward mobility                  9.5 
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For each period interval the percentage population in HDI bands in the initial year which 
have moved to various bands in the final year are shown. The bands are selected such that 
they are spread around the mean evenly. The row entitled “total population share” shows 
the percentage of population in each band at the beginning of the period and the column 
with the same title shows the same at the end of the period. A comparison of this row and 
column reveals the change in inequality over the relevant period. The details of such 
mobility are shown in the transition matrix (figures in italics). The immobility ratio is 
computed as the percentage of population not changing band by the final year (the 
diagonal of the transition matrix). The upward and downward mobility are the shares of 
population moving to upper or lower bands (the upper and lower off diagonal elements of 
the transition matrix respectively).  
 
There is little evidence of change in distribution for the period of 1975-80. More than 
98% of population remained in the same bands as the initial year. There is a little more 
downward mobility for the period of 1980-85, though essentially there is a high degree of 
immobility for this period. The degree of immobility for 1985-90 is very high again. It is 
during the period of 1990-95 that some upward mobility takes place. This is mainly due 
to some populated countries moving to a higher band (amongst them Pakistan, Iran, 
Sudan and Tunis). The downward mobility for this period is mainly due to some 
European countries or their offshoots dropping out of the top band due to this band not 
being wide enough to accommodate them all. The relatively big move takes place for the 
period of 1995-2001. During this period more than 21% of population moved upwards. 
Almost all this transition is in the middle part of the distribution and is explained by the 
upward movement of two highly populated countries: China and Bangladesh. The change 
in distribution is evident in the transition matrix as well as the changes in the overall 
distribution at the final period as compared to the initial period (column and row of “total 
population share”). For this period, and to some extent for the 1990-95, we see a 
movement towards the  “twin peaks” in distribution as suggested by Quah (1996a) and 
observed for income data in the long run by Jones (1997) and Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (2002).    26
 
The final section of Table 8 shows the mobility for the entire period of our sample, 1975-
2001. The “twin peak” effect is clearer in this longer interval. There are clear upward and 
downward movements in human development over the period of 26 years. The upward 
mobility has resulted in 26 percent of population in the sample to move from the bottom 
two bands to the upper middle bands. There is a 54% movement from the bottom band to 
the next band coupled by nearly 53% movement from the 2/3 to 1 mean band to the next 
upper band. The downward movement is mostly due to some European countries and 
their offshoots dropping to a lower band coupled with some relatively small downward 
movement from the second top band to the third. The overall changes in the distribution 
of human development in 2001 as compared to 1975 (column and row of “total 
population share”) depict a clear picture of movement from the bottom to the lower-
middle band, from the lower-middle to the upper-middle band and also from the top band 
towards the middle-upper band. The mobility ratios indicate that nearly 27% of 
population moved upward as compared to a downward mobility of 9.5% and an 
immobility ratio of nearly 64% during this period. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The concepts of convergence and inequality could be usefully employed in studying the 
evolvement of human development over time. The extension of conversion hypothesis to 
the non-income components of HDI could be validated conceptually and empirically. The 
growth regression for the medium and low human development countries shows an 
evidence of weak absolute convergence in human development over 26 years. These 
findings are robust and remain the same for various models of conditional convergence. 
The same is established for sub-samples of medium and also low human development 
countries. The measures of σ-convergence are in line with those for weak β-convergence.  
 
When the population size of countries are taken into account the results differ. The gini 
coefficient for medium and low human development countries shows a worsening of 
inequality while in the case of all countries sample we see little change in inequality over   27
the 26 year time span of this study. A regional breakdown of the sample over time clearly 
showed that in 2001 almost all countries in the bottom 20% of HDI are sub-Saharan 
African countries - a situation worse than that of 1975 for these countries. During the 
1975 to 2001 period, the Asian and Latin American countries experienced considerable 
progress in human development. 
 
Regarding population mobility between mean-relative HDI bands there is little movement 
for the first three five-year periods from 1975 to 1990. It is during 1990-95 that we see 
some upward and downward mobility with the former being higher. This is mainly driven 
by a number of medium populations size countries such as Pakistan and Iran moving one 
HDI band up and some less populated countries moving down. During the 1995-2001 
period, there is more upward mobility mainly caused by the highly populated China and 
Bangladesh moving up one band. This resulted in a considerable change in the middle 
sections of distribution. The change in distribution for the entire period of 1975-2001 
shows considerable mobility again in the middle part of distribution depicting a case of 
“twin peaks” with the previously dominant lower middle band peak in the beginning of 
the period being replaced by an upper middle peak at the end of the period.  
 
All this illustrates that there have been some signs of equalisation in the distribution of 
HDI but a few populated countries mainly drive this. There are also signs of polarisation 
particularly amongst the developing countries. While some countries, mainly in Asia and 
Latin America, have progressed considerably, the sub-Saharan Africa seems to have been 
caught in a deep trap of low human development with no signs of getting out of it. These 
countries are not moving in the direction of MDG as expected and, if the current trends 
continue, by 2015 they would be worse off in some aspects such as poverty and nowhere 
near the goals for the remaining MDG. To ensure improvements in human development 
in poorer countries, who need this most, and a reduction in inequality far more efforts 
than what has been done so far under MDG is needed. Given that poorer countries on 
their own lack the required resources for this purpose, as recognised by a number of   28
reports (such as WHO 2003 and UNDP 2003), far more rigorous efforts are required by 
international aid agencies and donor countries in order to change the current trends.  
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